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Abstract
We investigate a duopsonistic wage-setting game in which the firms have a limited
number of workplaces. We assume that the firms have heterogeneous productivity,
that there are two types of workers with different reservation wages and that a
worker’s productivity is independent of his type. We show that equilibrium unem-
ployment arises in the wage-setting game under certain conditions, although the
efficient allocation of workers would result in full employment.
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1 Introduction
In the literature we can find various micro-theoretic models of explaining un-
employment in the market, see for example, Weiss (1980), Shapiro and Stiglitz
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(1984), Ma and Weiss (1993), Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) among many others.
These works have the common feature that they neglect the strategic inter-
action between wage-setting firms competing for workers. In recent papers
Hamilton, Thisse and Zenou (2000), Thisse and Zenou (2000) and Wauthy
and Zenou (2002) showed that unemployment may arise as an equilibrium
of an oligopsonistic wage-setting game. Hamilton, Thisse and Zenou (2000)
and Thisse and Zenou (2000) based their analysis on Salop’s (1979) circular
city. Wauthy and Zenou (2002) considered a duopsonistic wage-setting game
in which the labour force is heterogeneous with respect to education cost and
in which to work for the high-technology firm requires more education. In this
paper we present another type of wage-setting game to explain unemploy-
ment. Our model may be regarded as an adaptation of Bertrand-Edgeworth’s
competition to the labour market.
To keep our model as simple as possible we distinguish only between two
types of workers, which differ in their reservation wages. However, both types
of workers have the same productivity. Moreover, there is a fixed finite number
of workers of each type. We assume that the two firms are heterogeneous with
respect to their productivity, but homogeneous with respect to the workers’
types. In addition, the firms have a limited number of workplaces. In this mar-
ket we will establish that under certain conditions equilibrium unemployment
emerges.
Though reservation wages are exogenously given in our model one might think
about how the difference in reservation wages between two types of workers,
whom we assumed to be equally productive, may emerge in real markets. One
example would be to consider male and female workers as the two different
types of workers. Supposing they have the same level of education, they can
be regarded as equally productive. However, female workers may have smaller
reservation wages because of possible discrimination or different opportunity
cost of time. Another example would be to distinguish between native and
ethnic minority workers. Again even if these two types of workers are equally
productive, workers belonging to ethnic minorities may have lower reservation
wages due to possible discrimination.
There is some relation between the Harris and Todaro (1970) model, which also
gives us a third example satisfying our assumption of equally productive work-
ers with different reservation wages, and the model presented in this paper.
The two types of workers can be interpreted as rural and urban workers. The
low-productivity firm operates in the rural area while the high-productivity
firm operates in the urban area. Rural and urban workers both satisfy equally
the requirements of the firms. However, urban workers have higher reservation
wages, which may be caused by higher unemployment benefits or by higher
costs of living. Thus, the emerging equilibrium unemployment results from
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the inflow of workers from the rural area into the urban area. 2 The main
difference between the present model and that of Harris and Todaro (1970)
lies in the wage determination process since we have endowed the firms with
strategic wage-setting power.
The equilibrium of the wage-setting game predicts to us how many workers
of each type will be assigned to a particular firm. In this respect our model
can be regarded as an assignment model which has the following interesting
feature: Unemployment in the market may exist though the workers have the
same productivity (skills) and the total number of jobs is equal to the total
number of workers. For an overview of assignment models in the job market
we refer to Sattinger (1993).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the
formal description of our model. Section 3 analyzes the capacity-constrained
wage-setting duopsonistic game and identifies those conditions under which
unemployment exists in the market. Section 4 concludes our paper. The more
technical part on the mixed-strategy equilibrium is contained in the Appendix.
2 The framework
Our labour market will be very simple. There are two different types of workers
denoted by α and β. We assume that workers belonging to the same type have
all equal reservation wages. Let us denote these values by rα and rβ. We shall
assume that rα < rβ. Suppose that the market contains mα and mβ workers
of type α and β respectively. For simplicity we assume that there are only two
firms denoted by A and B. We assume that, independently of the worker’s
type, a worker employed by firm A generates ρA and a worker employed by
firm B generates ρB revenue. This assumption means that the firms do not
care which type of worker they employ. We assume that firm B has a higher
productivity, that is, ρB > ρA. In addition, we assume that rα ≤ ρA and
rβ ≤ ρB, which implies that both types of workers can generate a surplus at
a certain firm. Suppose that the firms have a limited number of workplaces
denoted by nA and nB. The wages set by the firms are wA and wB. We say
that there is unemployment in the market, if there are workers who have
reservation wages less or equal to the higher wage offer, and did not get a
job in the market specified in the remainder of this section. Since we do not
want to consider ‘structural’ unemployment, we assume that mα = nA and
mβ = nB. Under these circumstances an efficient allocation of workers would
be if all α-type workers were assigned to firm A at wage rα and all β-type
2 In order to maintain the differences in reservation wages in a dynamic context,
one might think of rural workers employed in the urban area as commuters.
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workers were assigned to firm B at wage rβ.
We will consider the following wage-setting game: First, the firms make a wage
offer. Next, the workers are trying to get a job with the firm making the higher
wage offer if the offer exceeds or equals their reservation wages. If there are
no more vacancies at the high-wage firm, the workers turn to the firm with
the lower wage offer. We have to specify the strategic game describing the
situation in the market. Let the firms’ strategy sets be WA := [0,∞) and
WB := [0,∞) respectively. Clearly, nobody will apply at a firm setting a wage
lower than rα. It is also obvious that a firm setting a wage greater or equal
to rβ can fill all its workplaces since even if its opponent is setting a higher
wage, the workers not obtaining a job with the high-wage firm will apply to
the low-wage firm.
If at least one firm picks a wage from the interval [rα, rβ) and the other firm
from the interval [0, rβ), then only α-type workers will apply. Moreover, if they
set the same wage, we assume that the two firms share in expected value the
α-type workers in proportion to the size of their workplaces. If firm A sets the
higher wage, then it will employ all the α-type workers, while if firm B sets
the higher wage, it will employ min {mα,mβ} workers.
Suppose that firm B sets a wage greater or equal to rβ and that firm A sets
a wage in [rα, rβ). We assume that the number of α-type workers employed
by firm B is determined through a random sample. In particular, each worker
obtains a lottery ticket and mβ tickets are drawn (without replacement) out
of an urn filled with mα +mβ tickets. This means that the number of α-type
workers employed at firm B, henceforth denoted by X, has a hypergeometric
distribution. Hence, the probability of hiring k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,mβ} α-type workers
equals
Pr (X = k) =
(
mα
k
)(
mβ
mβ−k
)
(
mα+mβ
mβ
) .
It is also reasonable to assume that the number of α-type workers employed at
firm B is hypergeometrically distributed if both types of workers are equally
eager and able to obtain a job with the high-wage firm B. Note that we have
unemployment in the market with the exception of the low probability event
that X = 0, because β-type workers will not apply for a job with firm A.
Expected unemployment EX will be mβ
mα
mα+mβ
.
In a similar way as in the previous paragraph we can determine the expected
profits of the firms for the case when firm A sets a wage greater or equal
to rβ and firm B sets a wage in [rα, rβ). We assume that the number of α-
type workers employed by firm A, denoted by Y , is determined through a
random sample of size mα, where the sampling is done without replacement
from an urn containing mα +mβ workers. Then Y has also a hypergeometric
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distribution, i.e., the probability of hiring k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,mα} α-type workers
by firm A equals
Pr (Y = k) =
(
mα
k
)(
mβ
mα−k
)
(
mα+mβ
mα
) .
Now we have unemployment in the market with the exception of the low prob-
ability event that mα − Y = mβ, because β-type workers will not apply for a
job with firm B. Note that Pr (mα − Y > mβ) = 0 and expected unemploy-
ment equals mβ − (mα − EY ) = mβ mβmα+mβ .
Summarizing the cases described in the preceding paragraphs, firm A has an
expected profit function EpiA (wA, wB) :=

(ρA − wA)mα, if wA ≥ rβ;
(ρA − wA)mα mαmα+mβ , if wA ∈ [rα, rβ) and wB ≥ rβ;
(ρA − wA) max {mα −mβ, 0} , if wA, wB ∈ [rα, rβ) and wA < wB;
(ρA − wA)mα mαmα+mβ , if wA, wB ∈ [rα, rβ) and wA = wB;
(ρA − wA)mα, if wA ∈ [rα, rβ) and wA > wB;
0, if wA < rα.
and firm B has expected profit function EpiB (wA, wB) :=

(ρB − wB)mβ, if wB ≥ rβ;
(ρB − wB)mα mβmα+mβ , if wB ∈ [rα, rβ) and wA ≥ rβ;
0, if wA, wB ∈ [rα, rβ) and wA > wB;
(ρB − wB)mα mβmα+mβ , if wA, wB ∈ [rα, rβ) and wA = wB;
(ρB − wB) min {mα,mβ} , if wB ∈ [rα, rβ) and wA < wB;
0, if wB < rα.
Assuming that the firms are risk neutral, they will play game
Γ := 〈{A,B} , (WA,WB) , (EpiA, EpiB)〉 .
Notice that we have not included the workers themselves as strategic players,
but we have included their behaviour in the specification of (EpiA, EpiB).
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3 The equilibrium of the wage-setting game
Our aim is to determine the equilibrium of game Γ and those conditions in
the market under which unemployment exists. First, we investigate the case in
which firm A’s productivity allows firm A to make profits even through hiring
β-type workers, that is, in the following we shall assume ρA > rβ. Supposing
that firm B sets wage rβ we shall denote by w
∗
A the wage at which firm A is
indifferent to whether it sets wage rβ or w
∗
A ∈ (−∞, rβ) , that is, w∗A is the
solution of equation
(ρA − rβ)mα = (ρA − w∗A)mα
mα
mα +mβ
.
By solving this equation we obtain that w∗A =
1
mα
(rβ (mα +mβ)− ρAmβ).
Clearly, w∗A may be even less than rα, but we allow this to simplify our analysis.
In an analogous way we define the value w∗B ∈ (−∞, rβ) as the solution of
equation
(ρB − rβ)mβ = (ρB − w∗B)mα
mβ
mα +mβ
,
which results in w∗B =
1
mα
(rβ (mα +mβ)− ρBmβ). Observe that we have rβ >
w∗A > w
∗
B because of ρB > ρA > rβ.
The following proposition describes the outcome of game Γ in case of ρA > rβ.
Proposition 1 Suppose that ρA > rβ. Then in game Γ we have the following
cases:
(1) If w∗A < rα, then the unique equilibrium equals (wA, wB) = (rβ, rβ) and
there is no unemployment.
(2) If w∗A > rα and w
∗
B ≤ rα, then the unique equilibrium equals (wA, wB) =
(rα, rβ) and expected unemployment equals mβ
mα
mα+mβ
.
(3) If w∗A = rα, then (wA, wB) = (rα, rβ) and (wA, wB) = (rβ, rβ) are both
equilibria.
(4) If w∗B > rα, then an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist.
Proof. First, observe that neither of the two firms will set a wage above rβ.
In addition, any wage below rα is dominated by wage rβ. A strategy profile
(wA, wB) ∈ [rα, rβ)× [rα, rβ) cannot be an equilibrium profile because; if wA =
wB, then both firms have the incentive to unilaterally increase their wages
slightly, and if wA 6= wB, then the firm setting the higher wage can increase
its profit by reducing its wage slightly. Hence, in an equilibrium at least one
firm has to set wage rβ.
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Case (1): Suppose that w∗A < rα. We already know that at least one firm,
say firm A, sets wage rβ. Then from w
∗
B < rα it follows that every wage
wB ∈ [rα, rβ) is dominated by wage rβ. The same argument can be repeated
if we assume that firm B sets wage rβ.
Cases (2) and (3): We will split our analysis into two subcases: (i) w∗B < rα
and (ii) w∗B = rα. We start with (i). Suppose that w
∗
A ≥ rα and w∗B < rα. We
know that in a possible equilibrium at least one firm sets wage rβ. If wA = rβ,
then wB = rβ follows since firm B realizes less profit by setting a wage below
rβ than by setting wage rβ. However, if wB = rβ, then wage rα is a best reply
for firm A because EpiA (rα, rβ) ≥ EpiA (w∗A, rβ) = EpiA (rβ, rβ). In addition,
EpiB (rα, rβ) = EpiB (rβ, rβ) > EpiB (rβ, rα) = EpiB (rα, rα). Thus, (wA, wB) =
(rα, rβ) is an equilibrium. Observe that (wA, wB) = (rβ, rβ) is another equilib-
rium if w∗A = rα. Now we turn to subcase (ii). Suppose that wB = rβ. But then
firm A sets wage rα since EpiA (rβ, rβ) = EpiA (w
∗
A, rβ) < EpiA (rα, rβ) because
w∗B = rα implies w
∗
A > rα. We obtain that (rα, rβ) is an equilibrium strategy
profile since EpiB (rα, rβ) = EpiB (rβ, rβ) = EpiB (rβ, rα) = EpiB (rα, rα). Now
suppose that wA = rβ. But then firm B has two best replies: wB = rβ and
wB = rα, where in the first case (rβ, rβ) cannot be an equilibrium strategy
profile since firm A would deviate to wage rα. Consider the second possibility
of wB = rα. However, this is in contradiction with wA = rβ being an equilib-
rium strategy of firm A since EpiA (rβ, rα) = EpiA (rβ, rβ) = EpiA (w
∗
A, rβ) <
EpiA (w
∗
A, rα). Thus, we conclude that (rα, rβ) is the unique equilibrium strat-
egy profile in subcase (ii).
Case (4): Suppose that w∗B > rα. As was shown in the first paragraph of
this proof, in an eventual pure-strategy equilibrium at least one firm has to
set wage rβ. Suppose that wA = rβ. But then firm B sets wage rα since
EpiB (rβ, rβ) = EpiB (rβ, w
∗
B) < EpiB (rβ, rα). However, this is in contradiction
with wA = rβ being an equilibrium strategy of firm A since EpiA (rβ, rα) =
EpiA (rβ, rβ) = EpiA (w
∗
A, rβ) < EpiA (w
∗
A, rα). The same argumentation can be
repeated if we assume that wB = rβ. Hence, we conclude that a pure-strategy
equilibrium does not exist. 2
In case (1) of Proposition 1 wage rα is high enough to prevent the firms from
setting low wages. Therefore, we have full employment in the market. Let us
remark that in the full employment case α-type workers may be employed by
firm B and β-type workers may be employed by firm A.
Case (2) of Proposition 1 occurs if only firm B does not strictly prefer setting
wage rα to rβ whenever its opponent sets wage rβ. In this case firm B has no
vacancies but firm A cannot find enough workers since β-type workers will not
apply to firm A and only those α-type workers will apply to firm A who could
not obtain a job with firm B. Hence, all α-type workers get employed and there
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are β-type workers seeking for a job with firm B. In particular, we can expect
that mβ
mα
mα+mβ
β-type workers will not get a job. Thus, unemployment exists
in the market, which arises because of the inefficient allocation of workers
to firm B. All workers apply first to the high-wage firm B and workers are
hired through a first-come, first-employed mechanism, where each order of
arrival is assumed to be equally probable. 3 Unemployment is caused by a
mismatching between firms and workers. However, there is a serious reason
why we have to worry about matching workers with firms; in particular, the
high-wage firm cannot employ all the workers who want to be employed with
the high-wage firm, since the firm has only a limited number of workplaces.
Hence, competition is relaxed by the introduction of capacity constraints, as
is usually the case in Bertrand-Edgeworth type games. Among other reasons
this makes our model behave differently from Waughty and Zenou (2002).
Unemployment could also be explained by a lack of coordination between
firms. However, to avoid the emerging unemployment firm B has to introduce
a different selection procedure. Clearly, firm B has no incentive to employ a
different kind of selection procedure, since this might imply additional costs.
Hence, one cannot expect that this type of unemployment disappears if the
game is repeated infinitely.
Now turning to case (3) we can observe that either case (1) or case (2) emerges.
Finally, case (4) of Proposition 1 occurs if both firms set wage rα whenever
they believe that their opponent sets wage rβ. Unfortunately, in this case
an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. However, in a mixed-strategy
equilibrium a non-efficient assignment will arise with positive probability, that
is, either there will be unemployed β-type workers or β-type workers will not
apply for a job at all, since (rβ, rβ) cannot be an equilibrium in pure strategies
and (rβ, rβ) is the only undominated outcome leading to an efficient assignment
of workers. The mixed-strategy equilibrium can be found in the Appendix.
We still have to investigate the case of ρA ≤ rβ. Clearly, if even ρA < rβ, the
workers will not be assigned to the firms efficiently, since even if firm B sets
wage rβ, α-type workers will be employed by firm B with the exception of the
low-probability event of X = 0.
The following proposition determines the Nash equilibrium of the capacity-
constrained wage-setting game Γ for the case of ρA ≤ rβ.
Proposition 2 Suppose that ρA ≤ rβ. Then in game Γ we have the following
cases:
(1) If EpiB (rα, rβ) ≥ EpiB (0, rα), then the unique equilibrium is (rα, rβ) and
3 This results in the expected assignment of α-type workers to firm B described in
Section 2.
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expected unemployment equals mβ
mα
mα+mβ
.
(2) If EpiB (rα, rβ) < EpiB (0, rα), then an equilibrium in pure strategies does
not exist.
Proof. Clearly, firm A will never set its wage above ρA while firm B will never
set its wage above rβ. In addition, any wage below rα is dominated by wage
rβ for firm B and at least weakly dominated by wage rα for firm A.
First, suppose that ρA < rβ. Then a strategy profile (wA, wB) ∈ [rα, ρA] ×
[rα, ρA] cannot be an equilibrium profile because; if wA = wB, then at least firm
B has the incentive to unilaterally increase its wage slightly, and if wA 6= wB,
then the firm setting the higher wage can increase its profit by reducing its
wage. Hence, in a possible pure-strategy equilibrium firm B has to set its
wage in (ρA, rβ]. However, a strategy wB ∈ (ρA, rβ) cannot be an equilibrium
strategy of firm B since EpiB (wA, wB) is strictly decreasing on (ρA, rβ) in wB
for any fixed wA ∈ [0, ρA]. Thus, in a possible pure-strategy equilibrium firm
B has to set wage rβ. This implies that firm A has to set wage rα.
Second, in case of ρA = rβ strategy profile (rβ, rβ) cannot be an equilibrium
profile since then EpiA (rβ, rβ) = 0, while EpiA (rα, rβ) > 0. Through repeating
the argumentation of the previous paragraph one can show that a strategy
profile (wA, wB) ∈ [rα, ρA)× [rα, ρA) cannot be an equilibrium profile. Hence,
we obtain that profile (rα, rβ) is the only one which can still be a pure-strategy
equilibrium.
Finally, we have to determine the condition under which (rα, rβ) is a Nash equi-
librium. First, it can be easily checked that EpiA (rα, rβ) ≥ EpiA (wA, rβ) for
all wA ∈ WA. Second, we need EpiB (rα, rβ) ≥ EpiB (rα, wB) for all wB ∈ WB.
Taking into consideration that EpiB (rα, wB) is strictly decreasing on (rα, rβ)
in wB we obtain that
EpiB (rα, rβ) ≥ lim
wB↘rα
EpiB (rα, wB) = EpiB (0, rα)
is a sufficient condition for (rα, rβ) being a Nash equilibrium. In addition, if
EpiB (rα, rβ) < EpiB (0, rα), there exists a sufficiently small ε > 0 such that
EpiB (rα, rβ) < EpiB (rα, rα + ε). We conclude that EpiB (rα, rβ) ≥ EpiB (0, rα)
is a necessary and sufficient condition for (rα, rβ) being a Nash equilibrium
strategy profile. 2
Condition EpiB (rα, rβ) ≥ EpiB (0, rα) is equivalent to
mβ (ρB − rβ) ≥ min {mα,mβ} (ρB − rα) .
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Thus, clearly mβ > mα is a necessary condition for EpiB (rα, rβ) ≥ EpiB (0, rα).
Moreover, if mβ is increased sufficiently while mα, rα, rβ, ρA and ρB are kept
fixed, then (rα, rβ) will become a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Although in case (2) of Proposition 2 we did not determine the outcome of
game Γ we know that an efficient outcome with full employment is not possible
in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, since firm A will never set a wage above ρA.
Thus, if ρA < rβ, we have either unemployment with vacancies at firm A and
unemployed β-type workers, or a total of mβ vacancies and β-type workers
will not apply for a job.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we considered a wage-setting duopsonistic game in which the
firms differ in their productivity and the workers in their reservation wages.
To simplify the analysis we assumed that there are only two firms and two
possible levels of reservation wages. It would be interesting to determine the
outcome of a more general setting with n firms in the market and m different
levels of reservation wages. However, the number of cases to be investigated
increases rapidly as m or n increases and therefore, this generalization would
take much space.
Under certain conditions we pointed out the existence of unemployment (Pro-
positions 1 and 2). In particular, unemployment emerges because α-type work-
ers may occupy better paid jobs, which would be acceptable even for β-type
workers. Thus, we explain unemployment through a non-efficient assignment
of workers to firms. An interesting feature of the model is that unemployment
may emerge although the workers have the same productivity (skills). In ad-
dition, in case of unemployment there are also unfilled vacancies at the firm
setting the lower wage. The coexistence of unemployment and unfilled vacan-
cies has been demonstrated, for example, by Gottfries and McCormick (1995)
in a different setting.
To demonstrate the existence of unemployment in our job market we have
applied random rationing of α-type workers. This resulted in the application
of the input market equivalent of the so-called random rationing rule (at least
in expected value), which is well-known in the literature of price-setting games
in output markets. We refer to Vives (1999) for a description of rationing rules
in product markets.
An appealing way to resolve the assumption of equally productive workers
would be to consider a model like Wauthy and Zenous (2002). In particular,
consider the α-type workers as low-skilled workers and the β-type workers as
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high-skilled workers. Now suppose that α-type workers face education costs
EAα and E
B
α if they want to work for firms A and B respectively. Define E
A
β
and EBβ in an analogous way. Given that the α-type workers are the low-skilled
ones and firm A is the low-productivity firm it would be natural to assume
that EAα > E
A
β , E
B
α > E
B
β , E
A
α < E
B
α and E
A
β < E
B
β . Now even if we maintain
our assumptions imposed on the number of workers and workplaces (that is,
mα = nA and mβ = nB), it can be verified that there is a range of parameter
values such that we have full employment and the firms set different wages in
contrast to Proposition 1. A more complete analysis of this modified model
deserves attention in future research.
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Appendix
In the Appendix we consider case (4) of Proposition 1 in detail. We know that
in this case an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist and we start with
pointing out that we cannot apply the existence theorems on games with dis-
continuous payoffs established by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Simon (1987)
and Reny (1999) for all parameter values. To verify this latter statement we
can restrict ourselves to Reny’s (1999) Corollary 5.2, since the other existence
theorems on discontinuous games all follow from Reny’s corollary. In partic-
ular, for the case of mα ≤ mβ we will check that the mixed extension of
Γ′ := 〈{A,B} , [0, ρB]2, (EpiA, EpiB)〉 is not better-reply secure at (rβ, rβ). 4 It
can be easily verified that game Γ′ itself is not better-reply secure at (rβ, rβ),
since firm i ∈ {A,B} could only increase its profit by setting a wage below
w∗i . Now if firm i’s opponent reduces its wage slightly, then firm i makes zero
profit. Hence, firm i cannot secure payoffs higher than Epii (rβ, rβ). However,
we have to show that the mixed extension of Γ′ is not better-reply secure at the
profile in which both firms are setting wage rβ with probability one. Suppose
that firm i deviates by playing a mixed strategy resulting in higher payoffs
than Epii (rβ, rβ). Now if its opponent sets wage rβ − ε with probability one,
where ε is sufficiently small, then firm i makes less profit than Epii (rβ, rβ),
since it could only have slightly higher profit with a very low probability while
it makes zero profit with a very large probability.
In the following a mixed strategy is a probability measure defined on the
σ-algebra of Borel measurable sets on [0, rβ]. A mixed-strategy equilibrium
(µA, µB) is determined by the following two conditions:
EpiA (wA, µB) ≤ pi∗A, EpiB (µA, wB) ≤ pi∗B (1)
holds true for all wA, wB ∈ [0, rβ], and
EpiA (wA, µB) = pi
∗
A, EpiB (µA, wB) = pi
∗
B (2)
holds true µA-almost everywhere and µB-almost everywhere, where pi
∗
A, pi
∗
B
stand for the equilibrium profits corresponding to (µA, µB). We shall denote
the distribution functions associated with µA and µB by FA and FB, respec-
tively. 5
Propositions 3, 4, 5 and 6 provide the complete mixed-strategy solution for
4 Game Γ′ is better-reply secure if whenever (w∗, Epi∗) is in the closure of the graph
of its vector payoff function and w∗ is not an equilibrium profile, then there exist
an ε > 0, a player i ∈ {A,B} and a strategy wi ∈ [0, ρB] such that Epii
(
wi, w
′
−i
) ≥
Epi∗i + ε for all w
′
−i ∈ N
(
w∗−i
)
for some open neighborhood N
(
w∗−i
)
of w∗−i.
5 We follow the convention that the distribution functions are left-continuous.
Hence, FA (w) = µA ([0, w)) and FB (w) = µB ([0, w)) for all w ∈ [0, rβ].
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case (4) of Proposition 1. One can check that the solutions given by Propo-
sitions 3, 4, 5 and 6 satisfy equations (1) and (2). However, in what follows
we just provide the mixed-strategy equilibrium and omit the very tedious
calculations checking (1) and (2). 6
For the case of mα ≤ mβ we can have two different types of equilibria. The
first one is described by the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 If ρA > rβ, w
∗
B > rα, mα ≤ mβ and
(ρB − rβ)mβ(
ρB − ρA + (ρA−rα)(ρA−rβ)mα(ρA−rα)mα−(ρA−rβ)mβ
)
mα
< 1, (3)
then (µA, µB) given by
µB ({rβ}) = ρA − rβ
ρA − rα
mα +mβ
mα
, w = ρA − (ρA − rα) (ρA − rβ)mα
(ρA − rα)mα − (ρA − rβ)mβ ,
µA ([w, rβ)) = 0, µB ([w, rβ)) = 0, µB ({rα}) = 0,
µA ({rβ}) = mα +mβ
mα
(
1− (ρB − rβ)mβ
(ρB − w)mα
)
,
µA ({rα}) = ρB − rβ
ρB − rα
mβ
mα
− mβ
mα +mβ
µA ({rβ}) ,
FA(w) =
ρB − rβ
ρB − w
mβ
mα
− mβ
mα +mβ
µA ({rβ}) for all w ∈ (rα, w] , and
FB(w) =
ρA − rβ
ρA − w −
mα
mα +mβ
µB ({rβ}) for all w ∈ (rα, w]
is an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which the corresponding equilibrium
profits equal pi∗A = (ρA − rβ)mα and pi∗B = (ρB − rβ)mβ.
The following Proposition considers the other possible equilibrium that might
arise in case of mα ≤ mβ.
Proposition 4 Suppose that ρA > rβ, w
∗
B > rα, mα ≤ mβ and
(ρB − rβ)mβ(
ρB − ρA + (ρA−rα)(ρA−rβ)mα(ρA−rα)mα−(ρA−rβ)mβ
)
mα
≥ 1. (4)
Then (µA, µB) given by
6 These calculations can be found in a working paper version of this paper (Tasna´di,
2003).
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µB ({rα}) = 0, w = 1
mα
(ρBmα − ρBmβ + rβmβ) ∈ (rα, rβ] ,
µA ([w, rβ]) = 0, µB ([w, rβ)) = 0,
µA ({rα}) = (ρB − rβ)mβ
(ρB − rα)mα , µB ({rβ}) =
mα +mβ
mβ +
ρA−rα
ρA−wmα
,
FA(w) =
(ρB − rβ)mβ
(ρB − w)mα for all w ∈ (rα, w] , and
FB(w) =
mα
mα +mβ
(
ρA − rα
ρA − w − 1
)
µB ({rβ}) for all w ∈ (rα, w]
is an equilibrium in mixed strategies with pi∗A = (ρA − rα)mα mαmα+mβµB ({rβ})
and pi∗B = (ρB − rβ)mβ.
Now we turn to the case of mα > mβ. For this case we also have two different
types of equilibria.
Proposition 5 If ρA > rβ, w
∗
B > rα, mα > mβ and
(ρA − rα)mβ > (rβ − rα)mα, (5)
then a mixed-strategy equilibrium (µA, µB) is given by
µB ({rβ}) = ρA − rβ
ρA − rα
mα (mα +mβ)
m2β
− m
2
α
m2β
+ 1,
µB ({rα}) = 0, w = ρA − (ρA − rα) (ρA − rβ)mβ
(rβ − rα)mα , µB ([w, rβ)) = 0,
µA ({rβ}) = mα +mβ
mβ
(
1− ρB − rβ
ρB − w
)
, µA ([w, rβ)) = 0,
µA ({rα}) = ρB − rβ
ρB − rα −
mα
mα +mβ
µA ({rβ}) ,
FA(w) =
ρB − rβ
ρB − w −
mα
mα +mβ
µA ({rβ}) for all w ∈ (rα, w] , and
FB(w) =
(ρA − rβ)mα
(ρA − w)mβ −
(ρA − rβ)mα
(ρA − rα)mβ for all w ∈ (rα, w] ,
where pi∗A = (ρA − rβ)mα and pi∗B = (ρB − rβ)mβ.
Finally, we have to consider the other possible equilibrium that might arise in
case of mα > mβ.
Proposition 6 Assume that ρA > rβ, w
∗
B > rα, mα > mβ and
(ρA − rα)mβ ≤ (rβ − rα)mα. (6)
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Then (µA, µB) given by
µB ({rα}) = 0, w = 1
mα
(ρAmβ + rαmα − rαmβ) ,
µA ([w, rβ]) = 0, µB ([w, rβ]) = 0, µA ({rα}) = ρB − w
ρB − rα ,
FA(w) =
ρB − w
ρB − w for all w ∈ (rα, w] , and
FB(w) =
ρA − w
ρA − w
mα
mβ
− mα
mβ
+ 1 for all w ∈ (rα, w]
is an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which the equilibrium profits equal
pi∗A = (ρA − w)mα and pi∗B = (ρB − w)mβ.
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